The proponants of international courts (ICs) expect that creating formal legal institutions will help to increase respect for international law. International relations scholars question such claims, since ICs have no tools to compel state compliance. Such views are premised on the notion that states have unique preferences that ICs must satisfy in order to be effective. The argument here is premised on the notion that states have within numerous conflicting preferences. ICs can act as tipping point actors, building and giving resources to compliance constituencies -- coalitions of actors within and outside of states -- that favor policies that happen to also be congruent with international law.

Last modified

• 01/02/2019

Creator

• Karen Alter

DOI

• https://doi.org/10.21985/N2KT83

Alternate Identifier

• 10-003

Keyword

• buffett

Date created

• 2010

Resource type

• Research Paper

Rights statement

• In Copyright